Last month, a political crisis erupted in Fiji. Last week, another exploded
in the Solomon
Islands. So far, the world has largely shrugged. After all, these are isolated
islands in a region
that has become a bit of a strategic backwater. But taken together with the
steady crumbling of
Indonesia, instability on these islands can allow an outside power to gain a
strategic
advantage. Why? To keep the US Navy out of Asia.
Last month, a political crisis erupted in Fiji: an attempted coup, followed
by the seizure of
political hostages and a confrontation that continues. Last week, a political
crisis exploded in
the Solomon Islands. Both cases involve complex internal political, economic
and ethnic
issues that, in general, are of great interest to the citizenry but not of particular
interest to the
outside world.
It is therefore startling to step back and realize that with these two crises,
a virtually unbroken
belt of instability now stretches from the Straits of Malacca in western Indonesia
to the south
central Pacific. It is easy to dismiss this as an interesting coincidence. And
it may well be that
purely local forces exploded simultaneously. Nevertheless, the strategic implications
of events
may be very real, if not at all intended by the actors involved.
So far, the world has largely ignored the events in the Pacific. No calls for
international
intervention have gone up. The government in Australia, which has sought a larger
role in the
region, has in effect shrugged. Alone each of these events means little. But
taken as a whole,
they could threaten commercial shipping - and naval traffic. If, in the course
of a few years,
hostile forces emerge in control of these islands and portions of Indonesia,
the world will find
every reason to care.
At one level, there is both a common element and a common force driving events
from
Indonesia to Fiji. All of these societies are complex mixtures of traditional
political
arrangements coexisting poorly with approximations of modern states. But the
tension
between tradition and modernization has not been dealt with satisfactorily in
any of these
societies. As a result, long-standing ethnic tension has mixed with divergent
economic
interests to produce the ingredients of instability.
This region has, as of late, been a bit of a strategic backwater. But it was
not always. During
the US-Japanese competition for preeminence in the Pacific from the 1920s until
1945, these
islands made up the centerpiece of a great strategic struggle. American power
projection into
the Western Pacific toward China, Japan, Australia and the Philippines depended
on the
ability of the US Navy to navigate past these islands. Japanese airfields denied
the US fleet
passage during World War II. Brutal fighting from Guadalcanal to Tinian revolved
around
the use of these islands as unsinkable, if immobile aircraft carriers.
Defeating the Guadalcanal prevented them from moving east through Polynesia.
And so the
line of supply stretching from Pearl Harbor to Australia was never cut by Japanese
air power.
The United States could project power to Australia, blocking any plan to invade
Australia, and
allowing American forces to begin rolling back the Japanese in the Solomon Islands
and New
Guinea.
More than a half-century later, the US Navy still enjoys unchallenged access
to and through
all of these routes, the most important of which are the sea-lanes through the
Indonesian
archipelago. Through here pass the US carrier battlegroups on their way to the
Indian Ocean
and the Persian Gulf. Choking these off would cripple Washington's modern-day
ability to
project power. This is not as unthinkable as it might seem. Every day, Indonesia
crumbles
literally one island at a time.
But what power would be in a position to benefit from this situation? There
is but one: China.
The government in Beijing is clearly intent on becoming the dominant East Asian
power; it
has an interest in keeping US forces at bay and it has the means to take advantage.
So long as
American fleets lurk just over the horizon, China will fail in its ability to
redraw a new
regional order.
Consider the problem from the Chinese viewpoint. The presence of US naval power
near -
and sometimes just off - the mainland coast makes it difficult for Beijing to
control coastal
political interests that are naturally inclined to be more oriented toward the
outside world than
inland China. Today, coastal entrepreneurs have the navy of their foreign financial
partners
reassuringly over the horizon. The government is acutely aware that the US 7th
Fleet affects
both the regional balance of power and the domestic psychological fabric. The
fact that
Beijing cannot solve its Taiwan dilemma is testimony to this fact.
For now and the foreseeable future, Beijing has few conventional military levers
at its
disposal. A blue-water navy capable of challenging the US Navy could be generations
away;
it certainly won't put to sea in the lifetime of China's current leadership.
There is no powerful
navy in the world with which the Chinese can ally.
But if the current situation in the Pacific continues to deteriorate, it could
allow Beijing to
reach for an unconventional lever. The goal is not the destruction of the US
7th Fleet; the goal
is merely to make access, transit and the concentration of forces thorny. All
China would need
to do is take advantage of this emerging belt of instability, increase the risk
of passage
through the central and southern parts of the Pacific Ocean and divert US ships.
Instead of,
say, showing up unchallenged off of an Asian coast, American forces would have
to first
figure out how to get there.
The problem is partly political and partly technological. The Chinese have
worked hard on the
technical problem. Knowing that they are weak in both surface weaponry and air
power, and
aware that US anti-submarine warfare capabilities could probably rapidly diminish
China's
submarine force, China has concentrated on the use of missiles. In particular,
the Chinese
have concentrated on developing a generation of land-based anti-ship missiles,
including
cruise missiles. Already, these missiles have made American planners pause and
consider that
Beijing can at least partly enforce a blockade of Taiwan.
Now, imagine that these missiles are transferred to irregular forces operating
on a string of
unstable islands in Indonesia and the western and central Pacific Ocean. The
United States is
suddenly facing an equation very similar to the one it wrestled with in 1942.
If the Chinese -
or any other power - emulate the Japanese strategy with modern missiles, the
American navy
would find its way much riskier than ever before.
Since the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is already at work on the technical
problem, Beijing would have to grapple with the political problem. Even in a
crisis, placing
Chinese forces on these islands is a difficult task. All of these nations are
heavily exposed
economically and politically to the United States, Australia, New Zealand and
Japan.
Penetration is not easy, but at the same time Pacific Islanders have been extraordinarily
neglected, in many cases by these same countries. Particularly north of the
equator, the level
of development is so primitive that it is hard to find a government to influence.
South of the
equator, in Polynesia and some of Melanesia, the problems are so complex and
idiosyncratic
that it is difficult to get a handle on them.
This, of course, is the precise atmosphere in which a relatively low-cost campaign
of
destabilization and influence-buying could achieve a great deal. Given the fact
that no one
really is watching, the situation that is now unfolding can present a tremendous
strategic
opportunity for China. It does not take a lot of resources to buy influence
in these places.
And it doesn't take a great deal of acumen to trigger crises in societies that
are tinderboxes
anyway. Certainly, no matter who triggers the crisis, it does not take much
to exploit it.
Is there any evidence that China is behind any of the crises? Very little,
although over the past
year some straws have blown in the wind:
1.) Rumors have circulated that conflict in Guadalcanal was related to a struggle
between
pro-Chinese and pro-Taiwanese factions. Taiwanese foreign ministry spokesman
Chen
Ming-cheng responded to questions saying, ''The turmoil should not be used as
an excuse to
influence ROC (Taiwan)-Solomon Islands relations.'' It is interesting that the
spokesman
didn't just reject the question out of hand.
2.) Nauru, an island nation just northeast of the Solomon Islands has applied
for membership
into the United Nations. Its application had been deferred due to Chinese opposition.
China
objected on the grounds that Nauru has recognized Taiwan. Taiwanese Foreign
Minister
Jason Hu has called the Chinese policy ''naked hegemony'' and said that the
Chinese stance
was intolerable.
3.) China endorsed the application of Kiribati for UN membership. The Chinese
maintain a
satellite and missile tracking facility on Kiribati, which is located on the
equator, east of
Nauru. Interestingly, Kiribati's government has given final approval to Japan's
national Space
Development Agency to build a spaceport on remote Kiritimati, or Chistmas Island.
On the
equator and at 180 degrees longitude, Kiribati occupies an extremely strategic
position for
missile launches and communications satellite management. Boeing has plans to
launch
communicates into geostationary orbit from oil drilling platforms towed to the
region.
4.) Vanuatu's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Business Development
visited China last summer. The invitation was extended by Chinese Vice Prime
Minister Qian
Qichen. Vanuatu is sandwiched between Fiji and the Solomons.
The point here is that the governments in Beijing and Taiwan are - unlike much
of the rest of
the world - acutely aware of the importance of this region. The Chinese are
not acting
aggressively to expand their influence, but they are acting. Too aggressive
a course would
undoubtedly trigger a US response. Quiet bridge-building is the key. And the
Chinese are
quietly building bridges.
For about 50 years, no one has had any interest in increasing their influence
in this region.
This may not continue to be the case for much longer. China's need to counter
American
power - combined with Beijing's limited naval capability - makes a Pacific Island
strategy as
natural to them as it was to the Japanese decades ago.
There is, however, ample time for the United States, Australia and New Zealand,
acting in
concert, to developing a blocking strategy that is both effective and cheap.
The governments in
Australia and New Zealand, however, are relatively impervious to strategic thinking
these days,
tending to look at events piecemeal instead of eyeing long-term threats. And
right now US
strategy is on autopilot.
A potentially important chapter is opening in the Pacific. It will be interesting
to see if Beijing
takes advantage of it and whether anyone will care enough about this ignored
region to devise
a counter-strategy.
(c) 2000 WNI, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/
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This story appeared at: http://www.atimes.com/oceania/BF13Ah01.html
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