Engineering stability for troubled Melanesia Political troubles in Papua New
Guinea, Fiji
and Solomon Islands have called into question the suitability of their constitutions,
based
on democratic principles, to tackle problems of national unity and the co-existence
of
different communities. At the same time, some have suggested that slight tinkering
with
the constitutions, especially through greater protection of'indigenous' or collective
rights,
would fix the problem. Each of these disturbances has been analyzed as an ethnic
conflict.
There is a very real danger that wrong conclusions will be drawn from the present
crises,
and 'solutions' will be imposed that will serve only to aggravate problems.
The troubles
have been triggered off by different factors in each of the states: in PNG by
the ravages of
the Penguin mine, in Fiji by the orchestration of indigenous indignation against
a
government led by an Indo-Fijian, and in Solomon Islands by economic competition
between resident and migrant communities. The root of the troubles is the pace
of
economic and technological changes, which have seriously disrupted traditional
values and
structures, destabilized societies, and reduced their economic and political
self-sufficiency.
Integration in the world economy has been neither easy nor advantageous, and
globalization has added to their economic woes. The effectiveness or even the
willingness
of governments to deal with these problems and provide welfare has steadily
declined.
Economic and social insecurity has created conditions in which political adventurers
and
opportunists find it easy to persuade the people that other communities are
the cause of
their misery, and to incite them to violence against their members. Ethnic incitement
has
been easy because of the way the colonialists organized the division of labor
and
aggregated distinct communities within what became a state. There is thus undoubtedly
an
ethnic dimension to these troubles, but to concentrate on this is to focus on
the
symptoms of the malady and ignore the causes--as in the proposal to give a multi-million
dollar compensation to Malaitans thrown off the land in Guadalcanal or to reinstate
constitutional provisions for Fijian supremacy.
I do not mean to suggest that constitutions should ignore the ethnic dimension--
although much depends on how it is
done. Fiji's constitutions of 1970 and 1990 were explicitly based on indigenous
ethnic
hegemony and in PNG and Solomon’s ethnic distinctions were accommodated
through the
recognition of customary laws, traditional land systems, and provincial governments.
But
basically they were constitutions for a modern democratic state, with elected
and
accountable governments, independent judiciaries, protection of human rights,
and
universal and equal citizenship.
By providing for institutions for consensus building, elections, rights of
mobility, and the
accountability of government through political and judicial means, they constituted
the
framework within which the task of nation building could be undertaken. Unfortunately
that task was not undertaken, or only partially. The nation building agenda
of
constitutions could become effective only if a consciousness of being a nation
and a
culture of democracy were established. But parliamentary politics became merely
a means
to personal power and aggrandizement. With the exception of Fiji, there were
no political
parties, which tied communities to a national political program. Rooted, partly
by the
dictates of electoral systems, in their small clans, politicians met in the
national
parliaments as so many individuals, bent on advancing their personal fortunes.
It was all
too easy, and tempting, then, to pursue the commoditisation of the state apparatus
and
politics, and ignore the building of national policies or consensus.
Those who blame democracy for the ills of Melanesia, and prescribe ethnic solutions
need
to be reminded that rudimentary and even perverted though it is, democracy in
PNG has
held the state together, and that ethnic prescriptions in Fiji, in 1970 and
particularly in
1990, brought the economy to its knees, facilitated gross political and bureaucratic
corruption, and produced widespread anomie in its political system. In the mid-1990s
there
was increasing realization that Fiji's political stability and economic progress
depended on
a constitutional order that was fair to all its communities, protected every
one's human
rights, and was based on a national consensus. These attitudes facilitated a
constitution
oriented towards ethnic integration, through non-ethnic seats in addition to
ethnic
representation, an electoral system which placed a premium on appealing to voters
of all
communities, and a system of executive power sharing, in an emphatic rejection
of the
exclusiveness embedded in earlier constitutions.
The early experience of the 1997 Constitution, which provided extensive protection
of
individual and collective rights of indigenous people, was favorable. Ethnic
tensions
decreased, ethnic based parties began to integrate or co-operate across old
divides, and even
the appointment of an Indo-Fijian prime minister, with a truly non-racial government,
was accepted. It would be foolhardy to throw away the gains of this constitution,
to
placate a storm trooper. Speight's acts have discredited many Fijian institutions
and will
deepen the divisions within indigenous Fijians. What the Pacific states need
is democracy
to cope with the tensions of economic and social development, and the building
of a
consensus on national policies. Traditionalism cannot provide the framework
for
negotiating globalization or market economies. The lack of Fijian entrepreneurship
testifies to this truth. Moreover, operating at the level of the clan, traditionalism
provides
no basis for managing the state; and a confederation of numerous small isolated
communities is not an option.
Democracy is not without its travails, especially when there are opportunists
willing to
exploit ethnic distinctions for personal or class interests. Nor is it always
easy to operate.
Mahendra Chaudhry's failure perhaps lay in not grasping the priority to negotiate
the
transition to democracy, respecting the constitutional mandate of inclusiveness,
in an
environment where the land issue was likely to explode unless handled with delicacy,
and
when an alternative site of power in the form of Fijian administration, including
the Great
Council of Chiefs, and an ethnic Fijian army could be used by disgruntled Fijians
to
subvert the constitution. Australia and New Zealand, and others who see a role
for
themselves in solving the Melanesian crisis, would do well to strengthen the
apparatus
and infrastructure of democracy, and to start with support to non-governmental
and other
civic organizations without whose activism institutions of democracy will continue
to
remain organs of personal and ethnic politics.
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last revision June 25, 2000